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COMMENT

Investing in China's
Telecommunications Market:
Reflections on the Rule of Law and

Foreign Investment in China
Leontine D. Chuang*
I. INTRODUCTION

For two decades after Chairman Mao Zedong declared the formation of
the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, China remained dormant in the international economic arena. But in 1979, the sleeping giant
awoke when it voluntarily opened its doors to foreign investment and foreign trade by adopting an open door policy. Since that time, the Chinese
have taken off on a rocky road to build their economy and the legal structures around which their economy is to thrive. Though the road has been
bumpy, China's economy has grown by leaps and bounds since 1979.
From 1978 to 1993, its economy grew between US$2,000 and $4,000 per
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capita and in the early '90's its economic growth was unprecedented at 13%
a year.'
In 1979, the Chinese government enacted its first statute governing
foreign investment, entitled the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (hereinafter "JVL"). 2 Since then,
the Chinese government has continued to enact laws and regulations that
make up the legal framework governing foreign investment. One of the
most important laws enacted was the Foreign Economic Contract Law,
which governs all contracts with foreign parties (hereinafter "FECL").3
Even though almost 20 years have passed since the adoption of the first
foreign investment law in China, the legal framework governing foreign investment still remains unfinished and often misleading for foreign investors. This is unfortunate because not only does China have an unidentified
quantity of untapped resources, but it also has a population of 1.1 billion
people, comprising an attractive market where untold profits lay waiting.4
The lack of clarity in China's investment laws has translated into an
investment environment that is often uncertain, risky, and mired in red tape.
In fact, there have been cases where foreign corporations have invested in
joint ventures following what they thought to be all the requisite guidelines,
only to find out after the money had exchanged hands that something was
terribly wrong with the entire agreement. A perfect example of this is the
birth, development, and eventual demise of the ill-fated China-ChinaForeign (hereinafter "CCF") investment vehicles used for investment in
China's telecommunications industry in the past few years. This comment
will use CCF investment in China's telecommunications industry as a case
study to show how the vague legal framework for foreign investment in
China can make investment in China an unpredictable venture. It will also
discuss how a weak rule of law has contributed to developing this vague legal framework through promoting the existence of multiple interpretations
1See Neil Boyden Tanner, The Yin and Yang of Foreign Economic Contract Law in The
People's Republic of China-A Legalistic and Realistic Perspective, 16 J.L. & COM. 155
(1996); Gary J. Demelle, Direct Foreign Investment and ContractualRelations in the PeoRepublic ofChina, 6 DEPAuL BUs. L.J. 331, 333 n.13 (1994).
ple's
2
See John Zhengdong Huang, An Introduction to Foreign Investment Laws in the People's Republic of China, 28 J. MARSHALL L. Rav. 471, 472 (1995). The JVL was adopted at

the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979, and revised at
the Third Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on April 4, 1990. See Access
China, Law of the People's Republic of China: Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Law (Apr. 4,

1990) (visited Sept. 3, 1999) <http://www.accesschina.com/sinoeq.htm>.

3See Huang, supra note 2, at 472; China: ForeignEconomic ContractLaw, translatedin

24 I.L.M. 797 (1995). The Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of
China was adopted at the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National
People's Congress on March 21, 1985. See Mark C. Lewis, ContractLaw in the People's
Republic of China-Rule or Tool: Can the PRC's Foreign Economic ContractLaw be Administered
According to the Rule ofLaw?, 30 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L 495, 508 (1997).
4
See Demelle, supra note 1,at 332.
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of each law. Furthermore, this comment will reflect on the impact of the
U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement (hereinafter "U.S.-China WTO
Agreement"), signed in November 1999, and China's impending accession
into the World Trade Organization (hereinafter "WTO") on the case study.
It will also touch upon the possible ramifluations that entry into the WTO
will have on the rule of law in China.
China has an unlimited potential to grow. Foreigners who invest in
China, however, face many difficult hurdles and will often face tremendous
setbacks. Therefore, it is vitally important for foreigners to understand the
risks involved in investing in China and to be aware of the potholes created
by the weak legal framework.
At the end of the day, investors will weigh the costs and benefits of
doing business in China. For the past 20 years, most people have felt that
the benefits outweigh the costs. For the benefits to continue to outweigh
the costs, however, China must take steps to further develop the legal aspects of its foreign investment framework in all sectors of the economy and
to develop a stronger rule of law. Many people hope that China's impending accession into the WTO will be the catalyst that will not only push
China to provide more clarity to its legal investment framework, but will
also drive China to strengthen its rule of law. Some tremendous changes,
however, need to be made in order for this to happen. Though the Chinese
leadership has signaled, by signing the U.S.-China WTO Agreement, that it
is willing to make these changes in exchange for the ability to reinvigorate
its economy and to secure its position as a world leader, these changes will
not come easily, nor will they come quickly.

II. HISTORY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA
Between 1949 and 1979, China shielded its economy from the outside
world. During this period, the rule of law and formal legal institutions that
had been in place prior to the Communist takeover were largely dismantled.5 Furthermore, up until the late '70's, the communist-socialist system
put in place in 1949 did its best to cast negative light upon Westthat was
6
erners.
With the opening up of the economy, not only did China have to take
steps to create an environment for foreign investment, but it had to take
steps to prove to foreign investors that it did not view them negatively anymore. One of the first steps that it took was to enact the JVL. The JVL's
main premise was to permit foreign companies to join Chinese companies
in establishing joint ventures, approved by the Chinese government, that
5

See Michael J. Moser, Introduction to FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1-2 (Michael J. Moser ed., 1987).
LAW
6
See Daniel J. Brink & Xiao Lin Li, A Legal And PracticalOverview of Direct Investment and Joint Ventures in the "New" China, 28 J. MARSHALL L.REv. 567, 569 (1995).
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7
were in accordance with the principle of equality and mutual benefit.
Through specifically listing the main industries in which foreign direct investment was permitted, the JVL implicitly stated that China did not plan to
open its entire economy up for foreign investment.8 The second major law
that was enacted in an effort to create an investment environment where investors would feel comfortable was the FECL. 9 The FECL covered all economic contracts between Chinese enterprises and foreign enterprises. 10
In addition to enacting foreign investment laws, China also amended
its Constitution in 1982 to explicitly protect foreign investors' "lawful
rights and interests in the People's Republic of China."'" These legal enactments only represent a small number of changes that have taken place in
the past 20 years in an effort to build up a legal environment for foreign investment. To this day, however, the legal framework for foreign investment is still not fully constructed. There are still some sectors of the
Chinese economy that are not governed by any formal laws.
Another step that China took to build its legal framework for foreign
investment was to create the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (hereinafter "MOFTEC"). MOFTEC was created as a functional
department under the State Council and is in charge of the administration of
China's foreign trade and economic cooperation.' 2 MOFTEC's principal
duties are to form strategic plans; to formulate policies, laws, and regulations; and to coordinate all foreign trade, foreign investment and economic
development. 13 Its tasks also include inspecting and approving relevant foreign investment laws, regulations, and contracts involving foreign funded
enterprises. 14 One of the regulations that MOFTEC has formulated is the
Catalogue For The Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (hereinafter
"Catalogue"). 15 In the past, the Catalogue has been a very important guide
for all foreign investors because it lists the industries in which foreign investment is encouraged, restricted, or prohibited.' 6 With China's impend-

7

See Access China, supra note 2.
Regulationsfor the Implementation of the Law of The People'sRepublic of China on
Joint Ventures Using Chinese andForeignInvestment, translatedin 22 I.L.M. 1033 (1983).
8

9

See Lewis, supra note 3, at 508.

'0 See id.
"See Brink & Xiao, supra note 6, at 569.
12See China Ministry ofForeign Trade & Economic Cooperation,About MOFTEC (vis-

ited Nov. 3, 1999) <http://www.moftec.gov.cn/moftec/official/html/about-moftec/responsi
bilities.html>.
13See id.
14See id.

15 See China Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation, Cataloguefor the
Guidance ofForeignInvestment Industries(visited June 20, 1995) <http://www.moftec.gov.

cn/moftec/html/laws and regulations/investment25.html> [hereinafter "Catalogue"].
16See id.
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ing accession into the WTO, the Catalogue, if not revised, will become obsolete as it would be superceded by the WTO agreements.
China has also developed five main business structures for foreign investment.17 They are the equity joint venture, contractual joint venture,
wholly owned foreign enterprise, the limited liability company, and the
joint stock limited company. 8 The typical joint venture structure involves
one foreign party and one Chinese party both injecting a certain amount of
capital into the joint venture. 9 As its equity share of the joint venture, the
foreign partner generally provides the technology, management expertise,
and capital.20 The Chinese partner usually provides the factory site, industrial equipment, and other facilities. 2' Earnings from the joint venture are
and are also distribused to purchase materials, to pay salaries and wages,
22
uted to the partners as dividends from the venture.
On the whole, foreign companies have not been shy to invest in China
in the past 20 years. Between 1979 and 1998, foreign companies have invested an estimated US$268 billion in China.23 It appears, however, that
since 1993 the amount of foreign direct investment in China has been decreasing. 24 In fact, the amount of foreign investment has dropped 7% in
1999 alone.25 The decrease in foreign investment can be attributed to the
fact that companies are losing money in their foreign investment ventures,
foreign investors are tired of the bureaucratic red tape and regulatory hassles involved in investing in China, and China's economic growth has

17See Brink & Xiao, supra note 6, at 568.

t8See id. This article will only discuss joint ventures and not wholly-owned foreign enterprises, limited liability companies, or joint stock limited companies.
9

1 See PHILLIP DONALD GRUB & JIAN HAl LiN,

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN

CHINA
68 (1991).
20

Seeid. As this is only a description of a typical joint venture, variations may exist.
See id.

21

22 See id. at 69.

23The US $268 billion is the actual amount that was utilized. The amount contracted for
is US $571 billion. See The United States-China Business Council, Foreign and US Direct
Investment in China 1979-98 (visited Nov. 3, 1999) <http://www.uschina.org/press/ invest-

march99.html>.
24
See id. In the first six months of 1999, 8,052 foreign investment projects had been approved by MOFTEC; in 1998, 19,846 foreign investment projects were approved; and in
1997, 21,046 foreign investment projects were approved. See China Ministry of Foreign
Trade & Economic Cooperation, Statistics Data (visited Sept. 13, 2000), <http:/wwwv.
moftec.gov.cn/moftec/official/html/statisticsdata/e99-01-06d.htm.>; see also China Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation, Statistics Data (visited Sept. 13, 2000)

<http:/www.moftec.gov.cn/moftec/official/htmllstatistics_datale98-01-12d.htm>.
25See China-Signs of Weakening in Foreign Investor Confidence, Telenews Asia, July 1,

1999, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, RDS Business & Industry Database.
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slowed in the past few years. 26 In addition, the shifting regulatory environment is wearing out an increasing number of investors.2 This has been
evidenced by the increasing number of foreign investors pulling out of
China because of the failure of their joint ventures.2 8
From January to May 2000, China's actual foreign investment totaled
only US$12.8 billion, a decrease of 12% from the same period in 1999.29
Contracted investment was on the rise, however, totaling US$18.2 billion, a
25% increase over the same period in 1999.30 Whether the actual money
flowing into China will match up with the contracted investment dollar figure still remains to be seen.
Though the problems involving loss of revenues from China's economic slow-down is linked to the health of Asian economies as a whole, the
problems of a constantly shifting regulatory environment and bureaucratic
red tape are separate matters that can be solved by the government whenever it decides that it is time for reform. Foreign investors count on a
strong legal framework to support and protect their investments. Even
though China has tried to set up an environment that is friendly towards
foreign investment, it appears that the unpredictability of China's regulatory
environment, caused by its weak legal framework, is doing exactly the opposite. China's impending accession to the WTO, however, may be a
catalyst for change that will create a more protective environment for foreign investors.
III. CHINA'S IMPENDING ACCESSION INTO THE WTO

On November 15, 1999 China and the United States signed an agreement that would pave the way for China to enter the WTO.31 This deal
26

See Craig S. Smith, MultinationalsRethink Chinese Joint Ventures --- Red Tape and
Red Ledgers Spur Some to Pull Out: Others Hold Out Hope, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1999, at

A18.27

See id.
In 1995, DaimlerChrysler AG's Freightliner subsidiary was approached by a Chinese
company with a proposal to set up a joint venture to build trucks for China's container transport and construction industry. The Chinese company said that it would provide land and an
unused business license. A third partner claimed to have connections needed to secure government approval. Freightliner agreed, set up an office in Shanghai, and began paying the
$30 million it agreed to invest in the project when all of a sudden, it realized that there was
no way that the government would approve the project. The government said that they
weren't in compliance with China's auto policy. Now, Freightliner is trying to negotiate the
venture's
liquidation, something that also needs government approval. See id.
29
28

See Money Mirage: Foreign Investment Floods China, But Where's the Liquid?

(visited June 20, 2000), <http://www.chinaonline.com/issues/econnewslcurrentnewssecure
/c00061901.asp>.
30

See id.
The Real Leap Forward,ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1999, at 25. This agreement was

31See

adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives on May 24, 2000, by the U.S. Senate on September 19, 2000 and signed into law by U.S. President Bill Clinton on Oct. 10, 2000. See
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holds tremendous significance for foreign investors in China because it is
an important step towards China's accession into the WTO. China's eventual accession into the global trading body will not only promote increased
trade activity with China through providing greater access to China's markets, but will also potentially give foreign investors greater protection for
their investments.
The U.S.-China WTO Agreement was the culmination of 13 years of
negotiations between the U.S. and China. 32 The conclusion of these bilateral talks, however, is only one of many steps towards formal accession into
the WTO. China must also hold bilateral talks with other WTO members
and sign similar trade agreements with them before they can formally join
the global trade body. 3 After agreements have been signed with other
WTO member governments, the WTO's Working Party on Chinese Accession must agree on a technical protocol for China's entry and create the legal framework for its entry.34 All the bilateral agreements will be combined
into a multilateral one that paves the way for China's accession.35 The
multilateral discussions within the WTO framework may not be the last
step. Before China can accede, it will also have to amend its laws to comply with its WTO commitments and the WTO has to assess whether China
has complied with the trade body's rules in different areas.36
Since China and the U.S. signed their WTO agreement, other WTO
members have followed the United States' lead and have completed deals
with China. On May 19, 2000 China and the EU reached a market access
agreement that removed another major barrier to China's fourteen-year effort to join the WTO. 37 As of October 13, 2000, all but one of the 137
members of the WTO, Mexico, had concluded bilateral agreements with
China.3 8
In June 2000, China's chief negotiator on entry to the WTO and WTO
officials began drafting China's protocol of accession, which will serve as
the document that combines all the agreements China has signed with individual WTO countries. 39 China's chief negotiator told reporters that an acUrgent: Clinton Signs Bill on PNTR with China, Xinhua General News Service, October 10,
News Group File.
2000,
32 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
See The Real Leap Forward,supra note 31.
33
See The Remaining Hurdles, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1999, at 26.
34
See WTO's Moore Praises U.S.-China Deal, But Says Entry Not Likely Soon (visited
Nov. 15, 1999) <http://vwv.chinaonline.corn/issues/wto/newsarchive/secure/l1999/novemb
eric9l1523.asp>.
35
See The Remaining Hurdles,supra note 33.
36 See id.
37
See Paul Mooney, China-EUReach WTO Deal (visited May 19, 2000) <http://www.ch
inaonline.com/issues/vto/newsarchive/secure/2000/may/c00051924.asp>.
38

See Winds of Change Blowing; The Biggest Milestone Since 1978, S. China Morning
Oct. 13, 2000, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Nevs Group File.
Post,
39
See id.
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tion plan would be formulated detailing how China would tackle amending
or deleting some of its laws and practices affecting international trade to
make sure that they comply with WTO rules.40 Some of China's old laws
would be deleted as soon as China becomes a member of the WTO, while
others would be phased out over a set period of time.'"
One of the most important provisions of the U.S.-China WTO Agreement is the provision allowing foreign companies to invest in China's telecommunications market and Internet industry. This part of the agreement is
directly contrary to MOFTEC's Catalogue, which has long prohibited foreign investment in China's telecommunications industry4 because of national security concerns. The U.S.-China WTO Agreement states that
foreign companies may own as much as 49% in Chinese telecommunications ventures upon China's entry into the WTO and up to 50% in the second year.43 As WTO rules state that countries in the body or joining it rihust
have extended the same level of market access to all other members, other
WTO members will have the same level of access to China's telecommunications market. 44
Once China accedes to the WTO they are bound by the rules and
regulations of the organization and are also bound to participate in the WTO
dispute resolution process if trade or investment conflicts arise. This may
help decrease the investment risks caused by China's unpredictable regulatory environment, weak rule of law, and bureaucratic red tape. The main
question, though, is whether or not the Chinese government will make actual changes to embrace these new rules.
IV. THE UNICOM CASE

The failure of China United Telecommunications Corporation's (hereinafter "Unicom") CCF foreign investment ventures with foreign investors
is a perfect illustration of the risks created by China's shifting regulatory
environment and its weak legal framework.
Prior to 1994, China's telecommunications industry was a monopoly
market dominated by the state run China Telecom (hereinafter "CT"). 4 In
1994, in an effort to liberalize China's telecommunications market, Unicorn
40

See id.

41 See id.
42

Catalogue, supra note 15.
Seeks Benefits Amid Details of China Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16,
1999, at A19.
'See Robert Evans, China Sees 'FinalStage' of Bid to Join WTO (visited August 13,
2000) <http://www.chinaonline.com/issues/wto/currentnews/secureCO0051924.asp>.
'5See Douglas C. MacLellan, The China Telecommunications Industry and Implications
for Strategic Private Equity Investment 2 (Dec. 29, 1998) (unpublished paper for The
MacLellan Group, Inc.) (on file with author).
41See Big Business
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was created to break CT's monopoly on domestic wireline and cellular telephony."
The telecommunications industry in China is heavily regulated by the
government. 47 Regulations for the telecommunications industry are issued
and implemented by China's State Council and the Ministry of Information
Industry (hereinafter "M").4 8 Though there are currently no laws regulating this industry, a telecommunications law is in the process of being
drafted. 49 It will define the government's role in the industry, allow deregulation of tariffs, outline rules for new entrants, and foster orderly competition.50 This law will be the first comprehensive telecommunications
law in China and serve as the principal legal framework for telecommunications regulation.5 1 According to the MII, the drafting of this law will be
completed later on this year, but the legislative process could take much
longer.5 Legal analysts say that the law will standardize the regulatory
framework for the nation's telecommunications industry.53
China's telecommunications industry, as it relates to foreign investment, is also governed by regulations set by MOFTEC. Section VII, Part 1
of the Prohibited Foreign Investment Industries Chapter of the Catalogue
expressly prohibits foreign investment in the management of the telecommunications business. 5 4 When China accedes to the WTO, the Catalogue's
prohibition will be superceded by the WTO agreements opening the telecommunications industry to foreign investment. The industry will continue
to be governed by regulations set forth by the MU and MOFTEC.
Unicom has extensive political relationships with various ministries in
Three government ministries, the former Ministry of
the government.
Electronic Industry (hereinafter "MEil"; MEI is now a part of M), the former Ministry of Power Industry (hereinafter "MOP"), and the Ministry of
6
Railways (hereinafter "MOR"), are significant shareholders of Unicom.
When Unicom was formed, however, it was undercapitalized and lacked the
46

See id.
See id.
48
See id.
49
See id. Wu Jichuan, the head of MII, has announced that a formal law will soon be
47

passed that will govern the telecomcommunications sector. See China Online, China's Telecont Law To Be Promulgated "Soon" (visited Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.chinaonline.com/i
ndustry/telecomcurrentnews/secure/c9105.asp>.
50
See Christine Chan, Unicorn Document Reveals New Law's Intent, S. China Morning
May 18, 2000, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
Post,
51
See id.
52
See id.
53
See id.
54
See Catalogue, supra note 15.
55
See
56

MacLellan, supra note 45, at 2-3.

See id.
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financial resources it needed to compete with CT, which was the undisputed
the state giant.
As a result, in 1994, Unicom started to use a special financial scheme
to finance its telecommunications network buildout.5 7 This financial
scheme was known as China-China-Foreign or Zhong-Zhong-Wai or simply
CCF.58 The end result of the scheme was to have foreign investors provide
capital to finance Unicom projects in return for a share of revenues from
them.5 9 CCF was approved by the relevant government officials and between 1994 and 2000, 40 foreign companies invested around US$1.4 billion
into these telecommunications ventures operated by Unicorn. 60
To understand how these joint ventures fit through a legal loophole and
sidestepped the regulation banning foreign investment in the telecommunications sector, it is important to understand what the CCF investment
structure looked like. The CCF structure typically involved three parties.
A foreign investor first formed a joint venture with a Chinese partner that
was not prohibited from forming foreign joint ventures. 1 This joint venture
company would then sign various contracts and agreements with a Chinese
partner that was prohibited from forming foreign joint ventures.6 2 The foreign investor injected capital into the first joint venture company (formed
with the Chinese partner in the non-prohibited sector), which would then be
used to fund the projects with the second joint venture company (formed
with the Chinese partner in the prohibited sector).63 In return, the foreign
investor got a share of the revenues that were allocated to the joint ven-

57

See China Sets Limit on Unicom-Invented "Chinese-Chinese-Foreign" Investment
Model, Impact Hotly Debated at China Telecom 2000 Conference in New York, PR Newswire, Oct. 7, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, RDS Business and Industry Database; Telecommunications in China-Ban on Chinese-ChineseForeign Projects, East Asian
Business Industry, Dec. 10, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, RDS Business and In-

dustry Database.
58
This scheme is not unique to the telecommunications industry.
59

See Mark O'Neill, Beiing May Scrap Unicom Foreign-InvestmentFormula, S. CHINA
MORNING
PosT-BusINEss PosT, Sept. 23, 1998, at 4.
60
See id.; Ministry Investigatedfor Overstepping Authority, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Sept. 10, 1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. These
companies include Sprint International, Wireless Electronique, Ltd. [hereinafter "WelCom"],
Daewoo, Bell Canada International, France Telecom, and Deutsche Telecom. See Letter
from Douglas C. MacLellan, Chairman, Wireless Electronique, Ltd., to Bill Corbet United
States Trade Representative (Mar. 2, 1999) (on file with author); William J. McMahon,
South Korea's Daewoo Threatens to Sue China Unicom (visited Sept. 3, 1999)
<http://www.chinaonline. com/topstories/c9090116.asp>. The funding raised from the
CCF
ventures account for 72% of Unicom's funding. See PR Newswire, supra note 57.
61
See PR Newswire, supranote 57.
62

63

See id.

See id.
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ture. 64 Hence, the name CCF comes from the fact that there are two Chinese parties and one foreign party involved.
In the Unicom case, "China Unicom Shareholder Companies" were
established to form China-based joint venture companies with foreign telecommunications investors. 65 At the other end of the transaction, Unicom
set up provincial level operating companies, which were wholly-owned
subsidiaries of Unicom having the right to construct and operate networks
within their geographic area, to work with the China-based joint venture
companies. 6 6 The China-based joint venture company had no ownership in
the operating company, but had construction, financing, and services contracts with the provincial level operating companies.67 The operating branch
level companies distributed net earnings to the joint ventures that constructed its network, which in turn distributed earnings to the shareholder
companies and the foreign investors. 68 The joint venture and, hence, the
foreign investor had a right to sign ancillary contracts with the provincial
branches to maintain, service, and provide consulting services for the net69
work in return for a share of the revenues generated by the network.
Using this investment scheme, the foreign investor did not have direct
foreign equity ownership in the network operating ventures nor did they
have direct ownership in the operation of the networks, two things that were
prohibited by the government.70 By taking the extra step and forming the
extra joint venture, the foreign investor had successfully removed itself,
theoretically, from directly engaging in business with Unicom.
Article 7, Chapter 2 of the FECL dictates that contracts are valid only
when they are approved by the Chinese government, if such approval is re71
The law, however, does not
quired by law or by administrative decrees.
72
Contracts that
list all the different types of contracts that need approval.
all require apventures
in
joint
involve importing technology and engaging
7
agreement[s],
venture
proval. Article 3 of the JVL states that "equity joint
the venture
to
parties
by
the
contract[s] and article[s] of association signed
and apexamination
for
department
must be submitted to the relevant state

64See id.
65
See MacLellan, supra note 45, at 4-6. This example is given in reference to the general structure for most Unicorn CCF projects.
66 See id.
67
See id.
68
See id.
69
See id. at 5.
70
See id. at 4.

China: Foreign Economic Contract Law, supra note 3.
See id.
73See Zhang Yuqing & James S. McLean, China's ForeignEconomic ContractLaw: Its
Significanceand Analysis, 8J. INTL. L. Bus. 120, 130-34 (1987).
71See

72
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proval." 74 Like other joint ventures, CCF joint ventures required governmental approval, and CCF foreign investors were required to obtain business licenses from relevant provincial authorities before commencing
operations. 7s
Though the CCF contracts were either approved by MOFTEC, the
State Administration of Industry and Commerce, or local level officials7 6,
the foreign investors participating in the CCF schemes with Unicom could
not escape the venture's eventual demise. In October 1998, the Chinese
government, through the MI[, issued a statement stating that the CCF project contracts executed between Unicom and foreign investment enterprises
were "irregular" under state policy and regulation. In August 1999, MII
officially asked Unicom to ban CCFs and to correct the situation.78 On
September 29, 1999, Unicom notified their CCF investors that they planned
to cease all cash flow distributions and compensation to their foreign partners' joint venture companies as of October 1, 1999. 79 This notification
was seen as a formal declaration that Unicom was unilaterally rescinding all
of their CCF contracts.80
To resolve this issue, Unicom had to go through difficult negotiations
with their foreign partners to compensate them for the termination of the
CCF projects.8" In the beginning, the foreign investors had asked for more
compensation than Unicom was ready to give. Unicom was only willing
74
See Access China, supra note 2. Chapter 2, Article 8 of the Regulations for Implementing The Law on Chinese Foreign Joint Ventures also states that the establishment of a
joint venture in China is subject to the examination and approval of MOFTEC. See People's

Republic of China: Regulationsfor Implementing The Law on Chinese Foreign Joint Ventures,
translatedin 22 I.L.M. 1033 (1983).
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WESTLAW, TP-ALL Database.
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See China: Telecoms Firm Told to Abandon Foreign-Funded,Joint Ventures, BBC

Monitoring Asia Pacific-Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Feb. 4, 1999,
available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
78
See China-Telecom Service-No Foreign Fund, FT Asia Intelligence Service, Oct. 27,
1999, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News, Bus Anal. & Country Info, and Selected
Legal Texts and Codes.
79
See Douglas C. MacLellan, China Unicom Against the Foreign Telecom World 1 (Oct.
21, 1999) (unpublished paper for The MacLellan Group, Inc.) (on file with author).
"°See id.
81 See China-Telecom Minister Stresses Policiesfor Foreign Funds, FT Asia Intelligence

Wire, Sept. 19, 1999, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News, Bus Anal.& Country
Info, and Selected Legal Texts and Codes.
82
See Telephone Interviews with Douglas C. MacLellan, Chairman, WelCom (Sept. 27,
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MacLellan gave the author some background regarding his knowledge of doing business in
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to pay back the money that each foreign investor had already put into the
project, plus interest under terms set up by Chinese banks. 83 They were
also willing to extend an invitation to the foreign investors to purchase
shares of Unicorn at the time of their initial public offering (hereinafter
"IfPO",).84 Unicorn had offered large foreign telecommunications partners
up to 15% of the total shares in the post-IPO Unicom. s Their [P0, which
was originally planned for the end of 1999, was delayed until June 2000
largely because of the CCF disputes.86
As the negotiations were difficult and took a long period of time, Unicom decided that any CCF projects not concluded by the time of the IPO
would not be included in the listed vehicle.8 7 However, they were able to
successfully negotiate settlements with all their CCF investors by their IPO
date, June 21, 2000, and as a result were able to transfer all their assets to
the vehicle that went public. 8
Though the U.S.-China WTO Agreement opened up China's telecommunications market for foreign investment, the signing of the agreement
had minimal effect on the negotiations to end the CCF projects. A foreign
consultant involved in the negotiations stated that the agreement did not affect the CCF deals at all.8 9 After the agreement was signed, an official of
WelCom's CCF contracts in China, and also expressed his personal opinions regarding the
situation.
S3 See id.
84 See William J. McMahon, China Unicorn IPO GainsMomentum But Exit Strategy for
ForeignFirms Still Unclear, CHNAONLINE NEws, June 28, 1999 (on file with author); Martyn Williams, Newsbytes: Hong Kong, China, NEwvSBYTEs, Aug. 23, 1999 (on file with

author). The Chinese government has allowed its telecom companies, CT and Unicorn, to
list in foreign stock exchanges because this would help generate much needed capital.
Though this would allow foreign operators to buy into the firm, they would not have direct
involvement in its operation. See George Murray, Door Slammed on Foreign Involvement in

China Telecoms, Japan Economic Newswire, Sept. 17, 1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News, Bus Anal. & Country Info and Selected Legal Texts and Codes.
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the MII reiterated that the CCF projects were "irregular" and not only stated
that the issue of the CCF contracts was settled, but that it was not a WTO
issue.90 Furthermore, even in light of the agreement, Unicorn officials continued to state that it would be in the interest of the foreign investors to end
the use of irregular financing (from the CCF deals). 91
The final settlement for the CCF ventures left some investors unhappy
and disgruntled.92 All the settlements were confidential, but it is most likely
that investors received their initial investment back plus interest.93 They did
not, however, receive any administrative costs or expenses back as part of
their settlement. 94 In addition, some investors may have received an allocation of shares at the IPO or warrants to purchase shares in the future (not to
be triggered until 6 months after the date of the IPO). 95 Once the settlements were reached, the CCF ventures started the decommissioning process, which was estimated to take between 90 and 120 days.96
In the aftermath of the situation, the question is: how did this happen?
The foreign investors went into China with a clear plan and investment
scheme that was approved by the relevant government authorities. These
joint ventures were all in the midst of being carried out with money having
exchanged hands and construction having started on various projects. Why
then did the government suddenly decide that these ventures were "irregular"? How did the foreign investors end up in such a quagmire? Will accession to the WTO stop situations like this from happening again?
V. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA
To answer some of the questions posed by the Unicorn situation, it is
necessary to look at the legal framework that underpins the foreign investment environment in China. China has learned, since it opened its doors in
1979, that one of the keys to attracting foreign investment is the develop91
Statistics
ment of a legal system that is acceptable to Western investors.
indicate that they have been successful in attracting foreign investors. It is
questionable, however, whether the existing legal system can serve as a
9°See Christopher Parkes, Investors fight for "'Revised" Contracts, FIN. TIMES (visited
Nov. 17, 1999) <http://www.ft.com/hippocampus/q2ddle6.htm>.
91
See China Gains with WTO, FT Asia Intelligence Wire, Nov. 21, 1999, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, World News, Bus. Anal. & Country Info., and Selected Legal Texts
and Codes.
92See MacLellan Follow-up interview, supranote 88.
93
See id.; See also Forney & Dean, supranote 88.
94
See MacLellan Follow-up interview, supra note 88.
95
See id.; See also Fomey & Dean, supra note 88.
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See Peter Howard Come, Lateral Movements: Legal Flexibility and Foreign Investment Regulation in China, 27 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 247 (1995).
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solid framework on which China can continue to successfully attract foreign investment.
Many of the problems that foreign investors face in China stem directly
from the fact that the legal framework that guides foreign investment is
vague and weak. Why is that so even though it should be evident that one
of the keys to prosperity through foreign investment is a strong legal system? It can be partially explained by the fact that China has only had a very
short period of time-20 years-to build up a legal system that is compatible with their socialist market economy. The fact that the legal system is
relatively young, combined with the fact that the Chinese have a unique
conception of the meaning of the rule of law helps explain why their legal
system is so weak.
China's legal framework for foreign investment reflects a "tension
between encouraging foreign investment and maintaining state control over
the economy."9 8 The framework is regulatory in nature and puts a large
emphasis on state control of economic and social development. 99 Traditional Chinese culture has also played a large role in shaping the meaning of
law and shaping how laws are enacted in China.
Confucian teaching has always influenced the development of Chinese
law. 10 0 Confucianism favors seeking solutions by peaceful discussion
rather than by taking disputes outside the realm of the parties involved and
emphasizing the discord that is already existing.'0 1 In essence, anybody
who brings a conflict to court is viewed as having disturbed social tranquility and as being disruptive and uncultivated. 10 2 Therefore, the law has always been subordinate to virtue and Confucian principles of harmony,
peace, and conciliation. As a result, justice is not so much guided by the
law as it is guided by reason and an individual's virtue. As a result, from a
cultural standpoint, the rule of law is viewed in a different light in China
than it is in many Western countries.
China's economy is different from the Western capitalist economy that
most foreign investors are used to facing. These differences have influenced the development of the foreign investment legal framework. An important point to note is that China is trying to build a socialist market
economy.'0 3 Though they have tried to move towards developing a capi98See Pitman B. Potter, Foreign Investment in the People'sRepublic of ChinaDilemmas
ofState Control, in CHINA's LEGAL REFORMS 155 (Stanley Lubman ed., 1996).
99See id. at 156.
100 See ERIC LEE, COMMERCIAL DISPUTES SETTLEMENT INCHINA 1 (1985).
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talist economy by developing policies that allow markets to set prices and
determine the allocation of resources, that permit private ownership, and
that allow foreign investment and trade, the country still holds on to its
Communist roots.'0 4 China is a one party state, a "people's democratic
dictatorship," which some people say is a country ruled by men and not by
law.105 All the reforms and laws reflect the socialist influence of the Chinese Communist Party.
In addition to understanding the philosophical underpinnings of law in
China, it is also important to look at how laws governing foreign investment
are enacted. The development of the legal framework for foreign investment did not start until 1979. China's legal system and formal legal institutions were practically destroyed when their economic contact with the
outside world was cut off between 1966 and 1976.106 Only with the adoption of the open door policy in 1979 did the Chinese start to rebuild their legal system.
The highest legal authority in China is its Constitution, which was enacted in 1982.107 Laws are enacted by the National People's Congress
(hereinafter "NPC") and its various standing committees.0 8 The State
Council, ministries, and administrative agencies also issue regulations,
rules, provisions or measures, decisions, resolutions, notices, and orders
0 9 to
refine the legislative purposes of the NPC or its standing committees.'
Access to published Chinese legislation is difficult as there are no officially published gazettes or compilations of Chinese laws and regulations
that are updated regularly. 10 Moreover, internal rules that are applicable
may not be publicly disclosed."' Judicial decisions are not considered
precedents and therefore, are not considered sources of law.' 12 As Chinese
laws and regulations can come from many different sources, and as they are
not often published, it is difficult for foreigners to be knowledgeable of all
the laws and regulations that are applicable to them.
Once foreigners have jumped over the hurdle of finding out what laws
apply to them, they face another difficulty that is even harder to overcome.
Laws in China are inherently fluid and flexible. This is illustrated by the
'04See id.
'0 5 See id.

06See Moser, supra note 5, at 2.
107See Daniel A. Lapres, Christian Lamonin, & Liu Kefu, Introduction to the Chinese
Business and Legal Environment, in BusINEss LAW IN CHINA 19 (Daniel A. Lapres & Zhang
Yuejiao eds., 1997).
'°'See id.
'09 See id.

10 See Moser, supra note 5, at 3.
"'See Daniel A. Lapres, Christian Lamonin, & Liu Kefu, Introduction to the Chinese
and Legal Environment, in BUSINESS LAW IN CHINA, supra note 105, at 19.
Business
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characteristics of Chinese legal drafting that are employed in formulating
the law. Chinese laws are often filled with principle-like pronouncements,
vagueness and ambiguity, broadly worded discretions, undefined terms,
omissions, and general catchall phrases.1 3 These drafting techniques produce laws that are often subject to varied interpretations by different parties.
Instead of being a form of protection for foreign investors, these laws can
create risks that are built into the investment environment and hard to avoid.
In places where the rule of law is strong, such risks are minimized because the law is viewed as being absolute, as embodying a set of ethical
norms that are embraced by the society, and as being normative.1 4 Normative law serves as a clear guide for people's actions and behavior. 15 There
are three general principles that are reflected in laws that are normative:
certainty, generality, and equality 1 6 The certainty principle guarantees that
the law is stable and can not be manipulated by arbitrary power. 117 The
generality principle guarantees that the law is not particularized to policies,
goals, or individuals.1 8 The equality principle guarantees that the law is
applied to everyone equally.11 9 These three elements provide protection
against the exercise of arbitrary power by private individuals as well as
government officials.
In China, however, there is a gap between the law on its face and the
legal norms that are actually implemented. Chinese law is not normative,
but instead is instrumentalist. 20 As a result, it is not characterized by the
fundamental characteristics of normative law, that is, certainty, generality,
and equality. Law in China is used as a vehicle to promulgate the policies
and goals of the state. 121 It is state policy and not law that stands supreme.
Therefore, legislative enactments and laws do not represent norms that are
applied consistently in different situations, but instead represent ways to exercise state power. As goals and policies of the state change, so will the
interpretation of the law. Laws are intentionally left vague to provide room

for different interpretations that may apply at different times and by different people. This characteristic of the law, along with the fact that so many
different state organs can enact laws and regulations, makes it hard to determine exactly what laws are applicable and how those laws should be interpreted.
113See Come, supra note 97, at 253.
14 See

Lewis, supra note 3, at 500.
"SSee id. at 522.
1 6 See id.
7
" See id.
1 8 See id.
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As a result of this instrumentalist approach and the lack of normative
principles, the rule of law in China is often subordinated to the rule of the
individual. 122 The rule of law prevents arbitrary abuse of power by individuals and also protects enterprise and individual rights.2 But, in a place
where it is trumped by the rule of the individual and where law is subject to
interpretation by government officials who have to follow government policies and directives, an environment is created where there are autocratic and
unpredictable rules.124 Furthermore, frequent political infighting in China

often leads to policy inconsistencies that promote different interpretations
of the law. 125 There is an increased fear of unpredictability in an environment that has multiple government agencies enacting laws and regulations
and where it is not uncommon for those agencies' political egos to clash.
The implementation of state policy through the use of law is illustrated
by the FECL. The FECL sets a legal foundation for legitimate state intervention in almost all foreign business transactions. 26 One of the main principles of the FECL is the protection of national sovereignty and social
welfare. 27 As a manifestation of this principle, the FECL codifies the requirement of government approval for most contracts involving a foreign
party.1 28 It sets out the processes by which the government will use to review contract terms and the processes by which contracts are to be negotiated. 129 This guarantees that there is some degree of regulatory review by
the government before any contract is actually approved. The goal of the
review and approval process is to make sure that the projects comply with
the policies set out by the government. 30 Therefore, the law allows the
government to make sure that all foreign economic contracts conform with
state policy and goals.
Two articles in the FECL to pay special attention to are Articles 4 and
9 of Chapter 1. Together, they express the principle of sovereignty that is
embodied in the FECL.' 3 1 Article 4 states that "contracts must be made in
accordance with the law of the People's Republic of China and should not
be prejudicial to the public interests of society of the People's Republic of
122

See Chew, supra note 103, at 637.
"2See
id.
2
' 4 See id.
5
12
See id.
26

1 See Pitman B. Potter, Foreign Investment in the People'sRepublic of China Dilenunas
ofState Control,in CHINA'S LEGAL REFORMS, supra note 98, at 168.
' 27 In addition to this principle, the FECL is based upon three other guiding principles,

equality and mutual benefit, primacy of international treaties to which China is a party, and
honoring contracts and maintaining good faith in business activities. See Zhang & McLean,
supra
note 73, at 126.
128 See id.
29
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the public interest
China."' 3 2 Article 9 states that "contracts that violate ....
of the People's Republic of China are invalid., 133 Foreign investors should
be wary of terms like "public interest." Such terms are never clearly deto terminate agreements
fined and can be used by the Chinese government
1 34
or deny business licenses with no explanation.
VI. UNRAVELING THE UNICOM MYSTERY

Applying an understanding of the Chinese foreign investment legal
framework to the Unicorn case will help illuminate how the foreign investors got into this situation. Foreign investors that participated in the CCF
scheme with Unicorn, for the most part, took all the right steps to protect
themselves. The Unicorn quagmire was not caused by their actions. The
policy indeterminacy of the Chinese government and the inability of the legal framework to protect investors from this indeterminacy were the main
causes of the situation.
Using the details of WelCom's (one of the U.S. CCF investors) CCF
ventures with Unicorn as an example, it is easy to see that the foreign investors tried to take steps to protect their investment. In forming the CCF
joint ventures, WelCom took all the necessary steps that were mandated by
the government to set up a joint venture.
To form a joint venture, the first step for a foreign party to take is to
find a Chinese partner and have that partner submit a letter of intent for approval to the proper Chinese office. 5 As relationships still continue to be
the heart of the Chinese contract process, it is important not only for foreign
investors to cultivate a good relationship with the government, but for them
to find a Chinese partner who has a good relationship with the government. 136 The Chinese company chosen must have the authority to negotiate
joint venture contracts.1 37 Though finding a Chinese partner with a good
relationship with the Chinese government may not guarantee success, it is
one step that the foreign investor can take to improve their chances of success.
In WelCom's case, the investors probably could not have chosen a
partner that had a better relationship with the government or one that had
more authority to negotiate. WelCom had three fifteen-year CCF joint
13 2 See id.
33
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134 See id.
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36
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37
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all Chinese companies have the authority to negotiate. To find out if a particular
company has such authority, foreign parties may ask to see a copy of the Chinese company's
license issued by the State Administration of Industry and Commerce or a copy of their articles and look for a clause indicating such authority. See id., at 159.
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venture contracts with Unicom.13 8 Their investment partners were both
highly respected Chinese state-owned enterprises: Chinese Railroad Telecommunications Center, Ltd., the subsidiary company used to hold MOR's
ownership in Unicorn, and China Everbright Ltd.' 9 Choosing a stateowned company as a joint venture partner was probably one of the safest
choices one could make because state-owned companies are controlled by
the State, and therefore should be familiar with State policies.
In addition to choosing a safe partner, WelCom should have been further protected by the fact that Unicom itself put a clause into the joint venture contract stating that it had the right and authority to enter into such
contracts.1 40 WelCom's joint ventures, as well as all the other CCF ventures, were not only duly approved by Unicorn, a State-owned company
whose high ranking executives were appointed by the State Council, but
also by China's foreign investment administration authorities.141 In addition, central government leaders personally attended the contract
142 signing
ceremonies, indicating their tacit endorsement of these contracts.
The joint ventures allowed WelCom to participate in the build-out of
230,000 network lines.143 By the time the Government declared the CCF
contracts "invalid," Welcom had already negotiated equipment contracts for
its joint ventures and a credit facility to underwrite a majority of the equipment and operating costs of the joint ventures. 44 By May 20, 1999, they
had invested approximately US$22.8 million into their CCF joint ventures,
all of which had commenced commercial operations. 45 Before any joint
venture could be started, the FECL and JVL both dictate that MOFTEC has
to approve the contracts involved. With money already invested and the
commercial operations of the ventures already started, WelCom had no reason to think that it did not have approval from the government to go forward. Furthermore, the relevant authorities had not only allowed the
implementation of the CCF contracts with WelCom, but had allowed the
implementation of CCF contracts with the other 39 foreign investors. Unicom had also gotten approval from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange to use US$1.4 billion in foreign investment capital to purchase
telecommunications equipment and to build out various telecommunica-

38

Memorandum from Douglas C. MacLellan, Chairman of WelCom, to WelCom Shareholders 2 (May 20, 1999) (Memorandum used with the permission of Douglas C. MacLellan) 39(on file with the author).
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tions networks throughout China.14 6

Logic dictates that these contracts

would not have been approved in the first place if they had been illegal.
So what did the MU mean when, in 1998, it stated that CCF ventures
were "irregular" and must be "rectified"? The MI never stated that the
projects were "illegal." Their statements, however, implied that the CCF
structures should not exist because they were illegal.
Technically, though, the schemes were not illegal. The foreign investors were able to take advantage of a legal loophole in the system. The
government policy prohibited joint ventures that allow foreign management
and administration of post and telecommunications services. 147 It did not
prohibit a joint venture between a foreign investor and a Chinese company
that did not directly own and build telecommunications networks. Nor did
it prohibit a joint venture between a Chinese-based joint venture company
and Unicorn. In the case of the CCF ventures, the foreign investor did not
have direct control or ownership over the management or operations of the
telecommunications networks. Unicom's provincial branches retained all
the ownership and operation rights.148

The problem in this case was that the law prohibiting foreign investment in the telecommunications sector was broad enough so as to allow one
interpretation of the law by MOFTEC, which obviously allowed these investments in the beginning, and a completely opposite interpretation by the
MU, which later deemed these investments irregular.
Where the rule of law is weak and is mainly an instrument of the party,
the interpretation of the law can change. In this case, neither the law,
MOFTEC, nor the foreign investors' Chinese partner could protect and
guide the foreign investors because the rule of law was subordinated to the
rule of the individual. The gap between the normative reality of the law
(the actual letter of the law) and the actual implementation of the law was
evident. It did not matter what the law said, because two completely different interpretations were derived from it by two different agencies at two different times.
In this particular case, the interpretation changed partly because of a
clash of political egos. The telecommunications industry is at the center of
a clash between the liberal forces of the government which favor market reform and the conservative forces which do not.149 Liberal forces won the
battle when the State Council created Unicom in order to liberalize this
sector of the economy in 1994. But the conservative forces, led by Wu
Jichuan, the head of MU, struck back by persuading the government that the

146 See
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CCF schemes were only quasi-legal.' 50 This is not only an example of the
rule of the individual triumphing over the rule of law, but also an example
of how the instrumentalist approach taken by the Chinese in interpreting
law can be highly detrimental to foreign investors.
In the Unicom situation, the foreign investors had no protection from
the law. The legal safeguards that foreign investors put into their contracts
had little to no effect. Sometimes, foreign investors are blinded by the possibility of large profits and forget to adequately weigh the risks inherent in
this relatively young socialist market economy. This is especially the case
in markets like the telecommunications market because of the indeterminacy of state policy towards this sector, the internal political struggle between liberal and conservatives in this sector, and the lack of a law
governing it.
Looking back, however, there are two additional precautions, one legal
and one economic, that the foreign investors could have taken to provide
some protection for their investment.15 1 The legal precaution they could
have taken was to insert an arbitration clause into their contract that required arbitration outside of China.15 2 Though all the contracts had arbitration clauses, the clauses called for arbitration within China. 5 3 Some
54
investors felt that they would not have gotten a fair arbitration in China.'
The economic precaution that the foreign investors could have taken was to
buy political risk insurance from an institution
5 like the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank.China's foreign investment policies as well as its legal framework for
investment are relatively young. The combination of a vast state bureaucracy enacting laws and regulations and a Confucian tradition of deemphasizing the rule of law does not help the government build a legal
framework that is attractive and workable for foreign investors. The vastly
diametrical political forces within the Chinese Communist Party are also a
cause for concern for foreign investors because these forces often cripple
the existing weak legal framework.
VII. THE IMPACT OF THE U.S.-CHINA WTO AGREEMENT AND CHINA'S
IMPENDING ACCESSION INTO THE WTO ON THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA

The U.S.-China WTO Agreement and China's impending accession
into the WTO raises many questions about the future of China. Is China, a
socialist-democracy with its own brand of market capitalism, ready to carry
150 See
151
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out all of its promises to the WTO and further open up its markets, or will
resistance from conservative hard-liners cause continued uncertainty in the
foreign investment and trade arena? Many say that China is going to
change for the better and that WTO membership will bring China in line
with the rest of the world, forcing them to strengthen the rule of law and to
increase transparency for foreign investors.15 6 This would, in turn, increase
protection for foreign investors and help them avoid such situations as the
one with Unicom. But, this would mean that the Communist Party, which
has always seen itself as above the law, would have to give up some of its
sovereignty to the rules-based, supranational trade body and to individual
consumers and private companies.1 7 Once in the WTO, China will be
subject to the WTO dispute resolution procedures and disgruntled investors
will not be slow in lobbying their respective governments to use the system
as an arena to air their grievances. To hypothesize about how the WTO will
change China, it would be useful to first look at China's compliance with
past international agreements.
With respect to the legal system in China, enforcement has always
been the area of most concern. 15 Earlier economic agreements have often
required extensive renegotiations after they have been signed but before
they were truly put into effect.15 9 Some people say that China's record of
compliance with international agreements is not very good, with the most
glaring examples being its record with the United Nations Treaty160on Politirights.
cal and Civil Rights and its record on intellectual property
Based on a study of China's compliance with its recent obligations,
however, it appears that China's record, though mixed, is better than most

56
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november/c911152 1.asp>.
t57See China Opens Up, supra note 156, at 17.
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yahoo.com/h/nm/1 9991116/bs/wto_china_49.html>. Five years ago, the U.S Trade Representative negotiated an agreement with China guaranteeing protection of U.S. intellectual
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detractors think. 161 The record shows that China's compliance with sovereign treaties and agreements is better than its enforcement of commercial
agreements between private parties. 162 This is a very bad sign for foreign
investors. According to the study, China's score in the area of Private
Agreements is only poor to fair.1 63 The report states that the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, which dominates arbitration of foreign disputes in China, has, in the past, ignored evidence
presented by foreign parties and has favored Chinese parties.' 64 Furthermore, the report indicated that even if outcomes of venture capital disputes
are favorable judgements for foreign parties, they are often difficult to enforce. 165 So even though China has signed many bilateral WTO agreements, it is possible that foreign investors may not get the protection that
they need. This spotted record does not indicate that there will be immediate smooth sailing for foreign investors after China's accession into the
WTO.
Though the WTO rules require governments to stand back and allow
businesses to decide whether they want to buy foreign or domestic goods
and services, China does not yet have the culture, habits, or legal institutions needed to restrain its own officials from controlling or influencing
business deals. 166 Chinese-style socialist market capitalism has always
dictated that commerce is a state responsibility and trading decisions, as
well as foreign investment ones, have been made based on central-planning
requirements." Some say that though the economic arena is changing in
China, politics and ideology have changed very little. 68 Thus, even if the
reformist sector of the Chinese government is willing to adhere to all the
WTO rules, it is questionable whether they will be able to control the protectionist behavior of countless officials and Communist Party leaders who
not only
have their own agendas, but are not used to ceding power to oth16 9
ers.
16 1 The record is compiled by scholars at the Georgetown University Law Center and lists

compliance as either good, fair, or poor. See Daniel H. Rosen, China and the World Trade
Organization:An Economic Balance Sheet (visited Nov. 18, 1999) <http://www.chinaonline.

com/commentaryanalysis/wtocom/currentnews/secure/ca_990707_rosenpgl
.asp>.
162 See id.
63

See id.
'64 See id.
5
16 See id.
'

166See Robert Herzstein, Is China Ready for the WTO's Rigors?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16,
1999,6 7 at A30.
1

See id.

168 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Riding Winds of Reform, Yet Mired in Orthodoxy, WALL ST.

J., Nov.
17, 1999, at A15.
169 See Herzstein, supra note 166. Some say that MOFTEC is isolated among the ministries under the State Council, as most of the ministries are reserved on the WTO matter, if
not publicly opposed to opening their regulated industries. See Gary Chen, China's View of
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Although U.S. negotiators call the agreement "comprehensive," China
can still hamper foreign investment because under the agreement, foreign
investors still need government-issued licenses to do business. 170 Even
though markets may be opened by the WTO, foreign investors will still be
subject to many rules and regulations. As one Beijing-based lawyer noted,
"[At] the end of the day, they have a million ways to write rules to frustrate
an agreement. China will find itself in perpetual litigation in WTO dispute
panels. 171 Furthermore, though China has stated that it stands by the
pledges it made in the bilateral agreements, it has so far resisted demands
from WTO members to specify precisely how it will follow through with
many of its pledges. 172
Legal tribunals for impartial and speedy resolution of disputes with
Chinese authorities do not exist right now. 173 If the WTO does become the
primary forum for enforcing China's compliance with the rules, there are
the workload
questions as to whether the WTO will be capable of handling
China. 74
of all the potential complaints to be filed against
The opening up of the telecommunications industry is a perfect example of the uncertain days that lay ahead for foreign investors. Almost immediately after the signing of the U.S.-China WTO Agreement, Wu Jichuan
stated that the agreement would not dramatically impact China's information industry. 175 This is a rather bizarre statement, considering the fact that
the agreement had opened up the telecommunications industry, an industry
that previously had, theoretically, been completely closed to foreign investment. Wu further stated that though China's telecommunications sector
would be open to foreign investment, China would not only continue to reinforce regulatory efforts in the telecommunications industry by carefully
examining the qualifications of all foreign investors, but would facilitate
orderly competition according to the relevant regulations. 176 Wu also said
WVTO: Neither Boon Nor Bane (visited Nov. 19, 1999) <http://www.chinaonline.comcomm
entaryanalysis/vtocom/currentnewvs/secure/c911l7wtogary.asp>. Municipalities and local
governments have previously resisted implementing initiatives, such as the recent valueadded tax, until a time that suited them. See Alejandro Reyes, Just A Start: The Long WTO
Negotiations Look Easy Compared to What Comes Next (visited Nov. 24, 1999) <http:ll
99/1126/coverl.html>.
-vwv.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/
0
17
See Charles Hutzler, China FacesNew Enforced Rules (visited Nov. 17, 1999) <http:
9991117/wl/china_breakingrules I.html>.
//dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/1
71
1 See id.
t72 See WTO & China, FiN. TiMEs, Oct. 13, 2000, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
News
Group File.
173 See Herzstein, supra note 166.
74
' See id.
7 See China's Net Czar Downplays WTO Effect on High Tech Industry (visited Nov. 20,
1999) <http://www.chinaonline.com/issuesvto/newsarchive/secure/1999/november /c9111
805.asp>.
176
See id.
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that just because foreign investors would be allowed to hold a certain per77
centage of share capital does not mean that they must reach that figure.
This is a clear indication that approvals for foreign investment will still be
done on a case by case basis.
The statements made by Wu are a cause for concern. In the past, ministries and agencies have provided any number of reasons to reject foreign
investment, including rejecting applications because they "are not in
China's interest., 178 Foreign investors certainly hope that accession to the
WTO will make China's policies more transparent and less arbitrary. But
with a spotty record of compliance with international agreements and private contracts, politics and ideology slow to change, and a large bureaucracy filled with officials used to conforming the law to state policy, changes
will not happen quickly. On its face, China will comply with their WTO
promises because they have to. It is possible, however, for them to formulate regulations and rules that will frustrate the spirit of the agreements until
they are ideologically and politically ready to truly embrace all the WTO
rules and regulations. There are already plenty of examples of other WTO
countries that have skirted WTO regulations.17 9 If these countries have
done so in the past, so can China.
China, however, does appear to be making efforts to conform their
laws to WTO rules and regulations and to make their transition into the
WTO smoother. For example, in its new five-year plan for 2001-2005 as
well as its long-term goals for 2015, the MII stated that it will draft laws
and regulations that are in line with WTO market principles. 8 ° The MII
also stated that administrative statutes, including the Regulations on the
Administration of Foreign Investment in the Telecommunications Service
Sector and the Regulations on Computer Networks and Information Safety
Management, would be adopted to facilitate China's entry into the WTO.'
China has also set up a ministry-level mediation agency to ensure that all
177See Wu Jichuan Optimisticfor the Restructuringof China'stelecom Industry (visited

Jan. 7819, 2000) <http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/000 I 9/b200011425-SS.asp>.
1

See Lester J. Gesteland, Internet Not Fully Open to Foreigners Under China WTO-

Experts (visited Nov. 18, 1999) <http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/991117/c9111751 .a
sp>. 79
1 Japan, a member of the WTO, agreed in the mid-1980's to remove codified trade barriers and eliminate legal cartels. But this has made little difference in the ability of importers
to penetrate the Japanese economy because with Japan's informal governance structure, the
corporatist Japanese State could conduct business as if the codified legalities were still in
place. China too has an equally efficient informal governance structure, which they administer through the operations of the Communist Party. Therefore, China may continue to be
able to follow old state policies despite admission into the WTO. See Peter Brain, Chinese
Economy is Food For Thought (visited Nov. 22, 1999) <http://www.afr.com.au/content/99
11 17/world/world4.html>.
"8 °See Beiing Urged To Reshape Telecom Policies, (visited Apr. 18, 2000)

<http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/000417/2/B 100040638.asp>.
...
See id.
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the promises made during negotiations concerning WTO membership are
met. 8 2 This agency is headed by a Vice-Premier and will coordinate relations on all sides, hear complaints from 183
foreign businesses, and make sure
that all of China's promises are fulfilled.
Even so, China's rule of law will not change overnight. The "people's
democratic dictatorship" that Mao set up is simply too strong to be dismantled right away. Laws like the FECL, which legitimize state intervention in
foreign business transactions, will still exist. Political infighting between
reformist liberals and conservatives will still exist. Things will not change
until the Communist Party is no longer above the law and an open and
transparent judiciary system has been put into place. It will take more than
WTO membership to change China's weak legal framework.
The WTO though, is definitely a step in the right direction. By signing
the agreement, China has shown that they are willing to consider changes
that will fundamentally alter the way they have done business in the past 50
years. These changes will not come easily, but China's further integration
into the global economy will enhance the ability of China's trading partners
to influence China's behavior.184 China's membership in the WTO will
also have the potential to change China's internal politics, lending support
to the liberal reformist officials who hopefully understand that there needs
to be legal, social, and political reform to support the economic reforms that
are being implemented. Not until China formally accedes to the WTO,
however, will it be possible to determine exactly how quickly the much
needed changes will take place.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Reflecting on the Unicorn CCF situation, it appears that the legal and
political risks associated with investing in China are outweighed by the
economic windfall that the Chinese market can provide for foreign investors. When Unicom went public in Hong Kong in the middle of June 2000
it became the largest IPO in Hong Kong's history. 185 On its first day of
trading in the New York Stock Exchange, June 21, its shares rose 10%.186
'
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183 See id.
184See Mark W. Frazier and Peter M. Hansen, China'sAccession To The WTO: A Candid

Appraisal From U.S. Industry (visited Sept. 30, 1999) <http://www.nbr.org/publications/bri
efing/frazierbansen99.index.html>.
185Unicom's IPO raised over US$4.92 billion. See China Unicom's IPO Rings Up $4.92
Billion, AsIAN WALL ST. J., June 19, 2000, at 14.
186 See Lester J. Gesteland, China Unicorn IPO Exceeds Expectations, Closes at US$22,
(visited June 22, 2000) <http://vww.chinaonline.com/topstories/000621/1/cOO062153.asp>;
See also Ricardo Lachica, China Unicorn Gets Strong Welcome in First Session, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., June 22, 2000, at 2.
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Investors were apparently quite eager to purchase Unicorn shares even after
the CCF debacle, which clearly showed that investing in China is accompanied by a plethora of legal and political risks. This eagerness can be attributed to the almost limitless growth potential for the Chinese
telecommunications market. Financial analysts say that this potential is
enough to outweigh any political or legal risks. 18 7 It would, however, still
behoove smart investors to be well aware of the legal risks that exist in investing in China.
Investing in China has the potential to be a very lucrative venture.
Since China opened its economy in 1979, billions of dollars worth of foreign investment have been poured into the country. But images of dollar
signs have overshadowed some of the legal and political risks of investing
in a country with an economy and foreign investment legal structure that is
young and unpredictable.
Law in China is fundamentally instrumentalist and therefore is controlled by state policy. This opens up the possibility for the state apparatus
to dictate how a law should be interpreted. The legal framework that has
been built up has been, at times, weak and ineffectual, creating an unpredictable environment where investors are subject to many risks that are often unavoidable. The foreign investors in the Unicorn case were casualties
of this unpredictable environment. This case has also shown that the risks
of foreign investment are especially great in politically sensitive sectors of
the economy, like the telecommunications industry.
The beginning of this comment stated that the reason investors are
turning away from China is primarily because they are losing money, because of bureaucratic red tape, and because of the shifting regulatory environment. These three issues must be resolved in order for China to revive
the level of foreign investment to its previous heights. With the Asian
economy turning around, revenues will start increasing. Therefore, to reinvigorate its economy and increase the amount of foreign investment, China
must start to strengthen its rule of law and must start providing a stronger
legal framework that shields foreign investors from the political whims of
the vast bureaucracy. But this will not be an easy task.
China's accession to the WTO will help them start to strengthen the
rule of law, but only if the Communist Party is truly willing to alter some of
the bedrock principles of their one party system. This will require not only
changes in their political system, but their ideological system and their administrative bureaucracy also. China's rule of law will not be strengthened
overnight because the system is too entrenched in its old ways for changes
to happen quickly. But as time goes on, China will realize that political and
7

Jessica Wohl, IPO View-China Unicorn Seen Climbing in Large Debut, (visited
June 20, 2000) <http://www.chinaonline.com/reuters/China/06_18_2000.reutr-story-NI514
7923.html>.
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ideological change must come with the opening of its economy. The Chinese will also realize that to become a true world power, China must
strengthen its rule of law. In addition, they will feel pressure from their
trading partners, foreign investors, and the WTO bureaucracy to change and
will have no choice but to start making their regulatory environment more
transparent and fair to their economic partners. When China starts doing
this, the rule of law will inevitably be strengthened.
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